One Volk, One Church? : A Critique of the Folk Church Ideology in Finland by Hjelm, Titus
TITUS HJELM (MA, PhD, University of Helsinki) is Associate Professor in the Study of 
Religion, University of Helsinki. He is the editor of Peter Berger and the Sociology of 
Religion: 50 Years after The Sacred Canopy (Bloomsbury Academic, 2018) and of Is God 
Back? Reconsidering the New Visibility of Religion (Bloomsbury Academic, 2015). His 
articles have appeared in Journal of Classical Sociology, European Journal of Cultural 
Studies, Journal of Historical Sociology, Journal of Religion in Europe, Critical Sociology, 
and Religion. Special interests include sociology of religion, discursive study of religion, and 
religion and politics. 
 
Mailing Address:  
Department of Cultures 
University of Helsinki 
PO Box 59 (Unioninkatu 38) 
00014 University of Helsinki 
Finland 









Is the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland (ELCF) a state church or not?1 The 
answer depends on whom you ask. Looking at international surveys and comparisons, the 
answer is a clear “yes.” On Chaves and Cann’s six-point scale, Finland scored the highest of 
all 18 countries compared in terms of the state privileging one or more denominations.2 
Christensen’s analysis of historical and current debates on the issue of Finnish church and 
state relations—in many ways a precursor to my own aims here—says clearly, “The Church 
exists within a special relationship with the state, and maintains many of the same 
designations it held when its ties to the state were more official.”3 Robbers lists Finland 
among the countries with “a State Church or predominant religion.”4 Finally, Fox’s global 
comparison of religion and state relations files Finland under countries with “active state 
                                                 
1 Both the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland and the Orthodox Church of 
Finland have constitutional and legislative privileges that set them apart from other religious 
communities. This article focuses only on the former, as its size and social impact make it the 
paradigmatic case for debates on church and state in Finland.  
2 Mark Chaves and David E. Cann, “Regulation, Pluralism, and Religious Market 
Structure: Explaining Religion’s Vitality,” Rationality and Society 4, no. 3 (1992): 280, 284. 
3 Elizabeth Christensen, “Is the Lutheran Church Still the State Church? An Analysis 
of Church-State Relations in Finland,” Brigham Young University Law Review 2 (1995): 601. 
4 Gerhard Robbers, “State and Church in the European Union,” in State and Church in 
the European Union, 2nd edition, ed. Gerhard Robbers (BadenBaden: Nomos 2005), 578; see 
Michael Minkenberg, “The Policy Impact of Church-State Relations: Family Policy and 




religions,” i.e. countries where “the state has one or more official religions and the state 
actively promotes the state religion [through various measures].”5  
Against this background, the picture emerging from Finnish scholarship—especially 
theological analysis—is strikingly different: according to these views, the ELCF is not a state 
church. It is instead called a national, or a “folk” church (kansankirkko). Here the ELCF 
supposedly joins the other Nordic “folk” churches. 
This article is a critical historicization of the concept of “folk church” in Finland. It 
historicizes in the sense that it treats the concept not only as an accurate or inaccurate 
description of church-state relations in Finland, but also as an active architect of those 
relations. It is critical in the sense that it examines how the use of “folk church” contributes to 
particular ways of understanding the relationship between religious communities and the 
state, at the same time suppressing alternative understandings. In other words, the article asks 
what is being done when the ELCF is called a “folk church,” and what potential 
consequences does this have for the organization of church-state relations and religious 
equality in Finland? 
The construction of the “folk church” is examined through the analytical lens of what 
I call contemporary ideology critique. Ideology critique scrutinizes how discourse suppresses 
alternative understandings of social issues. The analysis has three sources: (1) Finnish and 
international scholarship, (2) the ELCF’s official representations of the relationship between 
church and state, and (3) a debate in the Finnish parliament concerning changes to the 
constitution and laws setting the ELCF apart from other religious communities. After 
introducing contemporary ideology critique and a brief historical contextualization of the 
issue, I will analyse each of these sources in turn. My aim is to show that seemingly innocent 
                                                 
5 Jonathan Fox, A World Survey of Religion and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), 111. Emphasis in the original. 
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definition-work by academics and the ELCF reflects on legislation processes such as the one 
analysed here. In conclusion, I argue that the concept of “folk church” functions ideologically 
by reproducing religious inequality in Finland.  
Contemporary Ideology Critique  
and the Discursive Construction of Church and State 
The relationship between church and state is historically constructed in tradition and 
legislation. In democratic regimes, this construction is accomplished through discourse, that 
is, the ways in which we talk about the relationship. However, scholarship on the discursive 
study of religion often omits the fact that discourse is rarely a matter of gentle evolution.6 
Instead, church and state relations in democracies are outcomes of discursive struggles and 
negotiations over the “correct” way of organizing the relationship. Hence, the process cannot 
be separated from questions of power.7  
Which brings us to ideology. This is a notoriously slippery concept—one mapping of 
scholarship concludes that “ideology” is used in 27 different ways—and the fact that the term 
is also regularly employed in everyday discourse complicates things further.8 For the 
purposes of this paper, however, it is sufficient to divide the different uses into two main 
                                                 
6 Kocku von Stuckrad, “Reflections on the Limits of Reflection: An Invitation to the 
Discursive Study of Religion,” Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 22, no. 2/3 
(2010): 156–169. 
7 Titus Hjelm, “Religion, Discourse and Power: A Contribution towards a Critical 
Sociology of Religion,” Critical Sociology 40/6 (2014), 855–872. 
 




strands and to develop the analytical strategy from there. Following Thompson, I will discuss 
the neutral and critical conceptions of ideology.9 
The neutral conception of ideology is familiar from the everyday uses of the term, 
where it is used to denote a “worldview.” All kinds of isms are frequently called ideologies. 
Political parties represent some of these ideologies, such as socialism and nationalism. Some, 
like feminism and environmentalism, for example, are labels for broader social movements 
and attitudes. The root of the neutral conception is in the ways in which classical social and 
political theory used “ideology.” Thompson calls this the “grand narrative of cultural 
transformation” in thinkers like Marx and Weber, who discussed ideologies (in the plural) as 
secular alternatives to religion, which “serve to mobilize political action without reference to 
other-worldly values or beings.”10 To put it differently, ideology in the neutral sense is a noun 
that describes the content of a worldview. 
Now, the critical conception looks at ideology quite differently. The critical tradition 
harks back to Marx and Engels—their German Ideology (1845), especially—although both 
also used ideology in the neutral sense. In this critical sense, ideology is intimately connected 
with power: “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class 
which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force.”11 
Famously, Marx saw religion—or Christianity more accurately—as an ideological tool for 
the ruling classes. Its opium-like qualities dulled the pain of everyday drudgery among the 
working classes and took attention away from improving their own conditions in this life by 
                                                 
9 John B. Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1990). 
10 Thompson, Ideology, 77. 




postulating salvation in the afterlife.12 Marx’s treatment of religion as opium is an example of 
what is often referred to as ideology critique. Ideology in this sense, then, is an adjective or 
an adverb that denotes a process where a particular idea works ideologically by suppressing 
alternative ideas.  
What I call contemporary ideology critique takes the cue from Marx and Engels, but 
instead of vague “ideas,” it focuses on the manifest use of language, that is, discourse. 
Thompson defines ideology as “meaning in the service of power.”13 Norman Fairclough 
speaks of ideologies as “constructions of reality (the physical world, social relations, social 
identities), which are built into various dimensions of the forms/meanings of discursive 
practices, and which contribute to the production, reproduction or transformation of relations 
of domination.”14 As said above, church and state relations are discursive constructions, but 
how we talk about these relations influences which discourse becomes dominant, which in 
turn has consequences for legislation and policy. Ideology critique analyses and “unmasks” 
ideological functions of church-state discourses.  
The critical discursive study of religion (CDSR), of which this article is an example, 
employs the concept of ideology in its critical sense.15 It seeks to analyse “the naturalization 
of inequality and the neutralization of dissent” in the form and meaning of discourse.16 CDSR 
                                                 
12 Andrew M. McKinnon, “Opium as Dialectics of Religion: Metaphor, Expression 
and Protest,” in Marx, Critical Theory, and Religion, ed. Warren S. Goldstein (Chicago: 
Haymarket Books, 2006), 11–29. 
13 Thompson, Ideology, 7. 
14 Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992), 87. 
1. 15 Titus Hjelm, “Theory and Method in Critical Discursive Study of Religion: An 
Outline,” in Making Religion: Theory and Practice in the Discursive Study of Religion, 
eds. Kocku von Stuckrad and Frans Wijsen (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 15–34. 
 
16 John E. Richardson, Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse 
Analysis (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007), 6. 
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does not stop at the description of what is said, but treats discourse as social action and 
examines what is being done when something is said. In the empirical analysis of discursive 
forms, I have applied elements from the template used by critical discourse analysts Norman 
Fairclough and John Richardson.17 These elements examine aspects of texts such as word 
choice, agency attribution, and textual presupposition. On a broader level of analysis, the 
focus is on the narrative and rhetorical aspects of discourse. Rather than indulging in an 
extended exposition of the apparatus at this point, I will discuss relevant methodological 
aspects as they arise in the analysis.18 Suffice it to say that the analytical focus of this article 
is on broader meaning rather than linguistic detail.  
Contemporary critique of ideology is always contextual. It is not mainly interested in 
the properties of “text” as such. Indeed, it is equally interested in what is not said as it is with 
what is said. What are the alternative discourses that are being suppressed when a discourse 
works ideologically? Whose voice can we hear and who is silenced? Refraining from saying 
something can be as ideological as saying it. Especially pertinent for the theme of this article 
is the construction of “common sense.” Common sense naturalizes our conceptions of the 
world and is therefore, according to Fairclough, “substantially, though not entirely, 
ideological.”19 Knowing what passes for common sense and why requires, however, an 
understanding of the context of discourse, which a strictly textual focus cannot provide. 
Milestones in Finnish Church-State Relations 
                                                 
17 Richardson, Analysing Newspapers, 46–74; Fairclough, Discourse and Social 
Change, 231–238.  
18 See Hjelm, “Religion, Discourse, and Power,” 860–865. 
19 Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, 84. Emphasis in the original. 
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A full discussion of the history of the state church and its discursive uses is beyond 
the scope of this article. However, a brief outline of some key dates variously offered as the 
dates for the separation of church and state helps to contextualize the analysis below. 
In a strict sense, the history of the ELCF begins in 1809 when Sweden ceded its 
eastern province of Finland to Russia. Before that date, Finnish religious life was uniformly 
dominated by the Swedish Lutheran church under the leadership of the monarch since Gustav 
Vasa’s top-down reformation in 1527. Under the Orthodox Russian Empire, Finland retained 
its Lutheran faith, and the ELCF became the state church of the autonomous Grand Duchy.  
The current ELCF webpage offers 1870 as the definitive date for the separation of 
state and church.20 The text offers no explanation why this year is significant, but the date is a 
reference to the Church Act of 1869 (which came into force the following year). This Act 
created the institution of the church synod and was a significant step in the growth of the 
autonomy of the ELCF from the church’s point of view. Because the Church Act covered 
only members of the ELCF and not all Finnish citizens (as previously), it tacitly admitted that 
Finns could be members of another Christian church. However, as church historian Juha 
Seppo puts it: “Everyone was still required to belong to some religious community. Thus the 
act did not acknowledge a complete freedom of conscience and religion, nor was it familiar 
with the idea of a confessionally neutral state.”21  
Significantly, Finnish history writing, when it comes to the role of the ELCF, seems 
to assume that an increase in the freedom of religion equals a proportional decrease in the 
                                                 
20 “State Church and Folk Church,” Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, 
accessed April 18, 2019, https://evl.fi/tietoa-kirkosta/kirkko-ja-yhteiskunta/valtionkirkko-ja-
kansankirkko. 
21 Juha Seppo, “The Freedom of Religion and Conscience in Finland,” Journal of 
Church and State 40, no. 4 (1998): 847–872, 852; Kimmo Kääriäinen, Kati Niemelä, and 
Kimmo Ketola, Religion in Finland: Decline, Change and Transformation in Finnish 
Religiosity (Tampere: Kirkon tutkimuskeskus, 2005), 55–6. 
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proximity of church and state. The first Constitution of independent Finland (1919) did, in 
principle, guarantee freedom of religion for the individual, and the Freedom of Religion Act 
of 1922 (in effect from 1923 onwards) further confirmed this. However, the ELCF retained 
its privileged position in the 1919 Constitution. Although practice of religion was free, a 
separate mention of one religious community in a country’s Constitution set it apart.  
Section 83 [Church Code for Evangelical Lutheran Church] 
(1) Provisions on the organisation and administration of the Evangelical 
Lutheran church shall be prescribed in the Church Code. 
(2) Other existing religious communities shall be governed by the provisions 
enacted or to be enacted on these communities. 
(3) New religious communities may be established in the manner prescribed 
by Act of Parliament.22 
The Constitution of 1999 retained this special mention, even if the wording changed:  
Section 76 - The Church Act  
Provisions on the organisation and administration of the Evangelic Lutheran 
Church are laid down in the Church Act.  
The legislative procedure for enactment of the Church Act and the right to 
submit legislative proposals relating to the Church Act are governed by the 
specific provisions in that Code.23 
As the analysis below shows, the Constitution and various legislation on religion 
gives rise to varying interpretations. Constitutional and legislative “facts” are not—at least in 
the Finnish context—in themselves arbiters of terminology. What would pass for “state 
                                                 
22 This is an unofficial translation from the International Constitutional Law Project, 
accessed April 18, 2019, http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/fi01000_.html. It should be noted 
that the 1919 Constitution, unlike the 1999 one, also mentions the “Greek Orthodox Church” 
in Section 90 (Other Appointments): “(1) Special provisions shall govern appointment 
procedures to public offices in institutions of higher education, the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and the Greek Orthodox Church as well as to public offices in the Bank of Finland.”  
23 The Constitution of Finland (11 June 1999), Finland Ministry of Justice, accessed 




church” in some other contexts is a contested notion in Finland. The concept of “folk church” 
is a key alternative, the uses of which I examine in the following sections.  
 “Folk Church” in Finnish Scholarly Discourse 
A detailed conceptual history of the term “folk church” in Finland is yet to be written, 
so I will only touch upon the broad contours of its use in contemporary Finnish and 
international scholarship. In this analysis, I have identified three main academic discourses: 
ELCF as folk church instead of state church, ELCF as an ambiguous folk church, and ELCF 
as state church. 
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the discourse on the ELCF as a folk church 
can be traced back to one source, namely church historian and Archbishop Mikko Juva’s 
book Valtiokirkosta kansankirkoksi (From State Church to Folk Church).24 Not only did the 
title canonize the term “folk church,” but it also naturalized the idea that the church moved 
from one status to another.25 In the book, Juva analysed late nineteenth-century debates 
regarding the status of the ELCF. Interestingly, although it is clear from the analysis that 
many contemporaries recognized that the debates challenged the prevailing state-church 
relations, there is hardly any mention of “folk church” in them. Juva seems to assume that the 
ELCF is in any case a folk church, which he describes as a “status that it has had for 
centuries.”26 What he is (implicitly) suggesting is that the change from state church to folk 
                                                 
24 Mikko Juva, Valtiokirkosta kansankirkoksi (Helsinki: Suomen kirkkohistoriallinen 
seura, 1960). All translations from the Finnish by the author. 
25 The German term Volkskirche can be traced to the writings of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher and appears in Finnish sources from the late 19th century, but for 
contemporary uses, Juva can be argued to be the main source. See Martin Hein, Wilhelm 
Hüffmeier, and Reiner Preul, “People’s Church (Volkskirche),” in Religion Past and Present, 
ed. Hans Dieter Betz, Don S. Browning, Bernd Janowski, and Eberhard Jüngel, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1877-5888_rpp_COM_025376. 
26 Juva, Valtiokirkosta kansankirkoksi, 105. 
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church is a change of emphasis, rather than a completely novel way of conceptualizing the 
status of the ELCF.  
Naturalization is, according to Fairclough, the process in which “ideological 
representations . . . come to be seen as non-ideological ‘common sense.’”27 There could 
hardly be a better term for the impact that Juva’s work has had. This has been especially 
profound in the socialization of new generations of theologians who have imbibed the 
terminology of the book, which has been part of course reading lists since its publication. As 
said above, it not only introduced the term “folk church,” but made it a premise of Finnish 
church history that there has been a movement in state-church relations from one status to 
another.   
This is most obvious in research that never explicates or justifies the use of “folk 
church.” For example, Ryman et al.’s book Nordic Folk Churches: A Contemporary Church 
History takes the term for granted, both generally and in the Finnish case. The introduction 
discusses the many entanglements of state and church from 1000 to 1940, but never talks 
about state churches. However, once we get to post-1940 Finland, the ELCF is introduced as 
a “folk church,” the only explicit criterion being that it is a “nationally significant church.”28 
A major history of the central synod of the ELCF between 1974 and 2011 puts “folk church” 
in the title, but does not explicate its use, although state-church relations get their own 
                                                 
27 Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis (London: Longman, 1995), 28; 
Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Power (London: Longman, 1989). 
28 Björn Ryman, “Nordic Churches from 1000 to 1940,” in Nordic Folk Churches: A 
Contemporary Church History by Björn Ryman, Aila Lauha, Gunnar Heiene and Peter 
Lodberg (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 1–17; Aila Lauha, “Finnish Christianity since 
1940,” in Nordic Folk Churches: A Contemporary Church History by Björn Ryman, Aila 
Lauha, Gunnar Heiene and Peter Lodberg (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 27–40. 
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chapter.29 Similarly, “folk church” is repeated uncritically in research reports produced by the 
church, even when—or perhaps especially when—they are about the question of state-church 
relations itself.30 In these examples, the term has become fully naturalized. 
If the above examples simply take “folk church” as a common-sense term, another 
type of study argues that there has been a change from state church to folk church. The 
historical process is explicated, then, but—following Juva’s example—becomes itself 
naturalized. Importantly for the socialization of future theologians, the latest introductory 
textbook for Finnish church history follows Juva faithfully but presents the change from state 
to folk church as an outcome of human actions rather than an unquestioned (and 
unquestionable) fact.31   
Providing some historical background becomes important especially in English-
language publications (by Finns and others alike), because when writing for an international 
audience, authors cannot assume the same contextual knowledge that makes “folk church” a 
meaningful term for Finns.32 In other words, the basis for calling the ELCF a folk church 
would have to be articulated, at least in principle, more explicitly.33 Interestingly, in these 
cases, the state church status seems to haunt the narrative in the background, although, 
ultimately, “folk church” or “national church” is the correct denominator for these authors.  
                                                 
29 Jaakko Olavi Antila, Kansankirkko ristipaineessa: Suomen luterilainen 
kirkolliskokous, 1974–2011 (Helsinki: Suomalaisten kirjallisuuden seura, 2014). 
30 Leena Sorsa, Kirkkona valtiossa: Katsaus Suomen evankelis-luterilaisen kirkon 
valtiosuhteen edellytyksiin ja uudistuspaineisiin. Kirkon tutkimuskeskuksen verkkojulkaisuja 
41 (Tampere: Kirkon tutkimuskeskus, 2015). 
31 Simo Heininen, Markku Heikkilä, Suomen kirkkohistoria (Helsinki: Edita, 1996), 
207, 227–228. 
32 Except in the other Nordic countries, where “folk church” is a common 
denominator. 
33 Although Ryman et al.’s book, which is discussed above, defies this argument. 
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In a translated and updated edition of a German original, Finland: Its Church and Its 
People, Geert Sentzke articulates the change by saying that “the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Finland is no longer a State Church in the strict sense of the word, but rather a 
national church linked with the State.”34 Nils G. Holm dates the separation of church and 
state to the passing of the Freedom of Religion Act of 1922/3, which led to the creation of 
what he also calls the two “national churches” (the ELCF and the Orthodox church).35 Again, 
vestiges of the state church status remain, although of the Nordic churches, “the national 
churches in Finland have the most liberated position in relation to the state.”36 Sihvo, writing 
in the same journal issue as Holm, also acknowledges that “the ties between church and state 
are many and strong” in Finland. Yet, Sihvo repeats Juva’s title almost verbatim when he 
says that “the state church is changing into a folk church.”37 All get support from Juha Seppo, 
who does not mention “folk church,” but argues forcefully that in Finland church and state 
are separate.38 The most recent (2017) survey of religion in the Nordic countries takes an 
                                                 
34 Geert Sentzke, Finland: Its Church and Its People (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola 
Society, 1963). The original is Die Kirche Finnlands (1935). 
35 Sakaranaho also speaks of a “national church,” but she does not discuss church-
state relations as such. Incidentally, her book chapter is titled “One Religion, One Nation?” 
This is not a case of copying, because the titles speak of different things. First, the issue at 
stake in the current analysis is the status of the ELCF in particular, not Christianity in general. 
Second, translation is complex, but I think “folk”—indeed, in the German sense of volk—
captures the primordial nature of the arguments regarding the role of the ELCF in Finnish 
culture better than “nation,” which is a more formal-sounding, institutionalized entity. Tuula 
Sakaranaho, “One Religion, One Nation? State, Church and Freedom of Religion in Finland,” 
in Religious Experience: North and South, ed. René Gothóni (New York: Peter Lang, 2012), 
89–123.  
36 Nils G. Holm, “Religion in Finland and the Scandinavian Model,” Social Compass 
38, no. 1 (1991): 9–15; This position could be challenged after the year 2000, when Sweden 
officially separated church and state. Göran Gustafsson, “Church–State Separation Swedish-
Style,” West European Politics 26, no. 1 (2003): 51–72. 
37 Jouko Sihvo, “The Evangelical-Lutheran Church and State in Finland,” Social 
Compass 38, no. 1 (1991): 17–24. 
38 Seppo, “The Freedom of Religion and Conscience in Finland,” 853–4.  
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ambiguous line as well: Overall, the book’s introduction distances itself from the concept of 
“folk church,” yet in the case of Finland, a later chapter states that the ELCF and the 
Orthodox Church in Finland are “official folk churches.”39  
Matti Kotiranta’s 2010 overview of Finnish church-state relations is probably the 
most conceptually conscious effort at discussing the status of the ELCF. It is worth quoting at 
length here: 
In social debate the concept of a state church has often been given a negative 
ideological shade of meaning. It has been suggested that the majority church, 
because it is a state church and enjoys certain privileges, is a threat to genuine 
freedom of religion and the status of religious minorities. An alternative 
expression to state church that is often mentioned, and a softer one with regard 
to the social position of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, is folk 
church. The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland has emphasized for 
decades that it is first and foremost a folk church.40 
For Kotiranta, speaking about the ELCF as a state church is ideological, which for 
him equals negative. Folk church, Kotiranta argues, is an alternative term that not only the 
church espouses, but as he later himself says, is accurate because the ELCF is a “folk church 
which serves the whole people.” Indeed, speaking of a state church is matter of law, while 
“folk church” is used to denote the sociological significance of the ELCF. Discursively 
speaking, what is interesting in the above quote is the simultaneous obfuscation of agency 
and how the author distances himself from what it said (modality): things have been given a 
meaning, have been suggested, and are mentioned by others, but we never learn who those 
                                                 
39 Inger Furseth, “Introduction,” in Religious Complexity in the Public Sphere: 
Comparing Nordic Countries, ed. Inger Furseth (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 1– 
29; Lene Kühle, Ulla Schmidt, Ulla, Brian Arly, and Per Petterson, “Religion and State: 
Complexity in Change,” in Religious Complexity in the Public Sphere: Comparing Nordic 
Countries, ed. Inger Furseth (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 81–135. 
40 Matti Kotiranta, “Religion and the Secular State in Finland,” in Religion and the 
Secular State: Interim National Reports, ed. Javier Martínez-Torrón and W. Cole Durham, Jr. 
(Provo, UT: The International Center for Law and Religion Studies, Brigham Young 
University, 2010), 277. Emphasis in the original. 
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people or institutions are. In contrast to this, Kotiranta’s italicized take-home point is 
unequivocal: “with the shift to folk church the traditional state church has been assigned to 
history.”41 
I would argue that the above cases are not examples of conceptual ambiguity—my 
second type of discourse discussed below—but rather of contradiction. The close relation of 
the ELCF with the state is acknowledged, yet all reproduce Juva’s original idea that the 
ELCF has changed from state church to “folk” or “national” church.42 It seems that these 
researchers—many of them theologians—want to have their cake and eat it too.  
The second type of discourse arising from the research literature is much more 
hesitant to use the term “folk church,” even if what they describe ultimately ends up looking 
a lot like what Juva’s followers espouse. In terms of authors distancing themselves from the 
question of the appropriate title for the ELCF, Kääriäinen’s brief note that “some speak of it 
as a state church, while others call it a state church,” acknowledges the use of both but 
refrains from taking a stand on terminology as such.43  
A slightly different case is that of “civil religion” and its derivatives. Originally 
coined by Rousseau, civil religion became one of the most debated terms especially in 
American scholarship after Robert Bellah’s much-cited essay “Civil Religion in America.”44 
However, where Bellah situates civil religion in practices outside institutional religion, such 
as the singing of national anthems and presidential speeches, Finnish treatments equate civil 
religion with the ELCF. Finnish national identity, according to this discourse, is so intimately 
                                                 
41 Kotiranta, “Religion and the Secular State in Finland,” 277. 
42 Except in the cases mentioned above, where “folk church” is completely 
naturalized. 
43 Kimmo Kääriäinen, “Religion and State in Finland,” Nordic Journal of Religion 
and Society 24, no. 2 (2011): 159. 
44 Robert N. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” Daedalus 96, no. 1 (1967): 1–21. 
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tied up with the institution of the ELCF that the church simply becomes an institutional 
manifestation of civil religion.45 It is hence a “national church” in the sense of the first type of 
discourse, but “civil religion” is used instead of explicit reference to “national” or “folk” 
church. The more important difference here is that “civil religion” is not used to replace a 
“state church,” that is, the church could be considered a state church as well, but civil religion 
is agnostic about that.  
A relatively recent key work on religion in contemporary Finnish society (published 
both in Finnish and English) argues in a similar vein using the term “popular religion”: 
“Institutional religion has ceded ground while popular religion emanating from people’s own 
needs and life situations has persisted and has partly found a channel for its expression also 
within the sphere of institutional religion.”46 In this discourse, the Durkheimian national 
rituals of civil religion are replaced by individualistic popular religion. While the ELCF’s 
impact on society has decreased, it remains a significant context for expressing individual 
belief—even when that belief is mixed with other non-orthodox beliefs and practices. Again, 
the church might or might not be a state church, but it certainly looks like a “folk church,” 
                                                 
45 Tapio Lampinen, ”Kansalaisuskonto vain yhteiskuntauskonto?” in Rajojen 
Ylityksiä: uskonto, kirkko, sosiologia, ed. Anne Birgitta Yeung, Heikki Pesonen, and Susan 
Sundback (Helsinki: Suomalainen teologinen kirjallisuusseura, 2006), 108–116; Susan 
Sundback, “Folk Church Religion – A New Kind of Civil Religion?” in The Church and Civil 
Religion in the Nordic Countries of Europe, ed. Bela Harmati (Geneva: Lutheran World 
Federation, 1984), 35–40; Kimmo Ketola, Heikki Pesonen, and Tom Sjöblom, ”Uskonto ja 
moderni yhteiskunta: Uskontososiologian keskustelunaiheita,” in Näköaloja uskontoon: 
Uskontotieteen ajankohtaisia suuntauksia, ed. Kimmo Ketola, Simo Korkee, Heikki Pesonen, 
Ilkka Pyysiäinen, Tuula Sakaranaho, and Tom Sjöblom (Helsinki: Yliopistopaino, 1998), 96–
137; Jere Kyyrö, “Fluctuations between Folk Church, Nation-State and Citizenship: 
Contextualizing Civil Religion in Finland,” in Religion im Kontext | Religion in Context, ed. 
Melanie Reddig, Annette Schnabel and Heidemarie Winkel  (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018), 193–
208. 
46 Kääriäinen et al. Religion in Finland, 175. 
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even without using the term explicitly.47 Although the focus is on individuals, the implication 
is that individuals continue to be socialized first and foremost into the ELCF.   
Finally, there is the scholarly discourse that conceptually treats the ELCF as a state 
church. I already mentioned the international scholarship in the introduction.48 Although I do 
not claim mine to be an exhaustive survey of the literature, I am confident in saying that in 
Finnish scholarship this discourse is a minority one. Indeed, I found only three examples. In 
the earliest, written for an international audience, the authors state: “one may conclude that 
there still are two State Churches in Finland, despite a gradual process towards fewer 
constitutional and other official links between the state and the two Churches.”49 Whether 
meant as such or not, the qualifier may in the beginning of the sentence is discursively 
important. It implies that should one want, the term may be used. However, “folk church” is 
not mentioned as an alternative. Neither is it mentioned by Ketola, who simply states that 
“the state church system has been gradually dismantled during the years,” implying that while 
the ELCF is not the state church it used to be, enough aspects of that status remain for it to be 
still called one.50 Finally, Mika Nokelainen defies the often-quoted idea that the Freedom of 
Religion Act of 1922/3 was the final nail on the coffin of the state church system. Instead, he 
argues that on the contrary, it enshrined this status by creating two classes of religious 
communities: those falling under the Freedom of Religion Act and those with constitutional 
                                                 
47 See Pasi Ihalainen, “The Lutheran National Community in 18th Century Sweden 
and 21st Century Finland,” Redescriptions: Yearbook of Political Thought and Conceptual 
History 9, (2005): 80–112. 
48 See footnotes 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
49 Markku Heikkilä, Jyrki Knuutila, abd Martin Scheinin, “State and Church in 
Finland,” in State and Church in the European Union, ed. Gerhard Robbers (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2005), 519–536. 
50 Kimmo Ketola, Uskonnot Suomessa: Käsikirja uskontoihin ja 
uskonnollistaustaisiin liikkeisiin (Tampere: Kirkon tutkimuskeskus, 2008). 
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and legislative privileges like the ELCF and the Orthodox Church. This was, according to 
him, especially true for the ELCF, which has broader autonomy than the Orthodox Church.51 
Although not scholarship, I should also mention here that Statistics Finland (the central 
statistical bureau) classifies the ELCF and the Orthodox Church as state churches.52  
In sum, there is no consensus in Finnish scholarship over whether the ELCF should be 
called a state church or a folk church. But the “from state church to folk church” discourse 
works ideologically in the sense that few scholars explicitly say that the ELCF is not a state 
church, yet by preferring to call it a folk church they perpetuate the idea that “state church” is 
not an appropriate term. This leads to two further questions: First, if and when the 
international comparisons cited in the introduction so overwhelmingly call the ELCF a state 
church, why do Finnish scholars—theologians, especially—insist on calling it something 
else? Second, what is the broader impact of this conceptual turn in the discourse on church-
state relations? I will tackle the former point in the conclusion, while the latter will be 
discussed in the two sections below. 
The Church’s Self-Presentation 
The next step of my analysis is to examine whether and how the scholarly 
conceptualization of the ELCF has found its way to the self-presentation of the church. Quite 
a few of the studies quoted above have been produced by the Church Research Institute, 
which is a department of the ELCF, so it is somewhat a matter of taste whether to file them 
under scholarship or self-presentation. In any case, they have been an important bridge 
                                                 
51 Mika Nokelainen, Vähemmistövaltiokirkon synty: Ortodoksisen kirkkokunnan ja 
valtion suhteiden muotoutuminen Suomessa, 1917–1922 (Helsinki: Suomen 
kirkkohistoriallinen seura, 2010). 




between academic conceptualizations and the church’s self-understanding and -presentation. I 
will here focus on the internet age, when self-presentation has become not only 
technologically more accessible, but also socially required. Specifically, I will content myself 
with a snapshot from the 2010’s using the official ELCF website (evl.fi) as a source.   
The current ELCF Finnish-language webpages have a dedicated page titled “The 
Church as Part of Society,” in which the church-society relationship is described as follows: 
The church is connected to Finnish society and culture in many ways . . . . 
Although the actual state church system was dismantled already in the 19th 
century, the church still has official connections with society, and the church’s 
operation is legislated by the Church Act.53   
Interestingly, the connection made here is to society (yhteiskunta) rather than to the 
state, although the “actual” state church system is said to have been dismantled already in the 
19th century. This is a reference to the 1870 Church Act, which made the ELCF autonomous 
from the state, but which had no effect on its privileged status. The hedging word “actual” 
implies—quite rightly—that some sort of state connection remained.  
A subpage titled “State and Church” tackles the question of state vs. folk church 
explicitly: 
The state church system has been dismantled in Finland in 1870. The state and 
the church are separate actors and the church makes its decisions 
independently. . . . The ELCF is better characterized by the word folk church. 
Majority of Finns are members of the church and it takes care of many 
important social functions. Lutheran culture and customs appear in many ways 
in Finnish culture.54  
Unlike the starting page, the dedicated text on church and state is unambiguous about 
the ELCF not being a state church but a folk church instead. Indeed, it is as if the introductory 
paragraph is a pre-emptive comment on comparative studies such as Fox’s: “In every 
                                                 
53 “Church as Part of Society,” accessed April 23, 2019, https://evl.fi/tietoa-
kirkosta/kirkko-ja-yhteiskunta?OpenDocument&lang=FI. 
54 “State and Church,” accessed April 23, 2019, https://evl.fi/tietoa-kirkosta/kirkko-ja-
yhteiskunta/valtionkirkko-ja-kansankirkko. Emphasis in the original. 
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country, the relations between the majority religion and the state have been organized 
differently, and the systems are incomparable.”55 In turn, the “folkness” of the church is 
justified by numbers (the “democratic” argument, see below) and by the ELCF’s role in 
culture. The latter is further reinforced on the page titled “Cultural Heritage”: 
Church environments are a central part of our cultural landscape. The rhythm 
of ordinary days and celebration, work, and rest is based on the Christian 
tradition. The churchly cultural heritage is present on every day of the year.56  
Despite majority membership numbers, so few Finns attend the regular Sunday mass 
weekly that the church’s own research prefers to present the number as people who visit at 
least once a month, which was nine per cent in 2015.57 Rhetorically, then, it is the latent 
aspects of our “churchly cultural heritage” that matter more—indeed so much so, that these 
are present on all days of the year for the volk.   
In contrast, the English-language version of the current ELCF website is sparse, to say 
the least. The page titled “Lutheranism in Finland” says only the following: “Prayer has been 
at the heart of many people's lives in Finland through the centuries, but – and this is a very 
Finnish characteristic – faith is a largely private matter.”58 Church and state are not 
mentioned at all. Religion is private and comes close to some sort of nature mysticism: “Even 
today, many Finns seek God in nature and the wilderness: in a forest, by a lake or at the 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 “Cultural Heritage,” accessed April 23, 2019, https://evl.fi/tietoa-kirkosta/kirkko-ja-
yhteiskunta/kulttuuriperinto. 
57 Kimmo Ketola, Maarit Hytönen, Veli-Matti Salminen, Jussi Sohlberg, and Leena 
Sorsa, Osallistuva luterilaisuus: Suomen evankelis-luterilainen kirkko vuosina, 2012–2015 
(Tampere: Kirkon tutkimuskeskus, 2016), accessed April 23, 2019, 
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seashore.”59 The sub-pages titled “history” and “worship in diversity” do mention key dates 
familiar from the above, but without explanation of their meaning.  
The silence on the church and state issue is interesting in light of the previous 
homepages of the ELCF. I did an illustrative analysis of those pages for a conference paper in 
2013, but I do not know when the page changed.60 Thanks to the Wayback Machine archive, 
the pages can still be found. The Finnish and English language pages resemble each other 
much more than the current pages. The English version is not, however, a direct translation. It 
is worth looking at the pages side by side. 
 
Translation from the Finnish: English Original: 
Finland does not have a state church system, 
but the church can be called a folk church. 
The church and state cooperate in many 
ways. […] [The Church] is an integral part 
of the people’s history and culture. Majority 
of Finns belong to the church. The church’s 
ceremonies, from baptism to funerals, and 
its customs are part of the Finnish 
tradition.61  
The Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
Finland has traditionally been labelled in 
two different ways: some speak of it as a 
state church, while others call it a folk 
church. Both labels are somewhat 
misleading and susceptible to 
propagandistic use…. These days Finland 
no longer has a state-church structure in the 
precise sense of the term. The system has 
                                                 
59 Ibid.  
1. 60 Titus Hjelm, ‘One Volk, One Church? A Critique of the 'Folk' Church Ideology in 
Finland.’ Presented at the annual conference of the British Sociological Association, 
London, UK, April 2013. 
 
61 “Valtiokirkko purettu kansankirkoksi,” accessed April 23, 2019, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20131030173059/http://evl.fi/EVLfi.nsf/Documents/85BBFB48
16F713BEC2256FEA003A7232?OpenDocument&lang=FI. Emphasis in the original. 
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been dismantled step by step so as to give 
greater internal independence to the 
Lutheran Church.62 
In Finnish, the question of state vs. folk church is unambiguous. Finland does not 
have a state church. But, there is—in bold—cooperation (yhteistyö), which is further 
explained in subsequent sub-pages. The text then repeats how the ELCF is hegemonic both in 
terms of numbers and culturally.  
In English, by contrast, there is a whole paragraph of what Fairclough calls 
“hedging,” in this case, the “some say, others say” structure.63 Neither “state church” nor 
“folk church” is entirely correct and, significantly, both are “susceptible for propagandistic 
use.” It is as if the ELCF is admitting the ideological nature of both terms! Furthermore, the 
English page also admits, in a way that Finnish pages do not, that 
 [both terms] remain useful in that they still give a rough picture not only of 
the position of the church in Finnish society, but also of the relationship 
between the church and the state. In order to understand the current religious 
situation and church politics in Finland, it is important to bear in mind the 
country’s strong state-church oriented tradition. This tradition is so long-
standing and influential that the current situation is difficult to understand 
outside this context.64  
The now defunct pages warrant a fuller analysis, even if they are no longer the official 
face of the church to Finns and English-speakers. The brief analysis here suffices to 
demonstrate the point about naturalization made above: “Folk church” (kansankirkko) in 
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https://web.archive.org/web/20130312072427/http://evl.fi/EVLen.nsf/Documents/A47B48B9
B3B2188AC22572B400213CE6?OpenDocument&lang=EN. 
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Finnish is the shorthand for “not state church.” The old webpages at least go into detail about 
the basis for the conceptual change—although the end of state church status is always 
measured by the ELCF’s autonomy from the state, never by its perpetual privileged status—
but the complicated situation is only implied on the current pages. Silences matter.  
“Folk Church” and the Status Quo in Parliament  
My third set of data is a transcript of a plenary session in the Finnish parliament on 
February 15, 2006. The Members of Parliament (MPs) debated a Members’ Initiative (diary 
number LA157/2005) regarding the equality of religious communities in Finland and 
proposed amendments to the constitution and several laws legislating the privileged status of 
the ELCF and the Orthodox Church.65 There was never a vote for its passing because a new 
parliament was voted in while the proposal was doing the rounds in legislative committees. In 
Finland, proposals do not carry over to the next parliament. The case is nevertheless 
important because, as both discourse analysts and scholars of parliamentary democracy have 
noted, speeches in plenary sessions are about displaying MP’s political credentials to their 
voters, media, and the broader public, while hammering out the details of initiatives happens 
in parliamentary committees.66 Hence, the dominant type of research into religion and politics 
                                                 
65 All quotes from the parliamentary debate refer to diary number LA 157/2005. Laki 
Suomen perustuslain 76 §:n kumoamisesta sekä eräiden siihen liittyvien lakien kumoamisesta 
ja muuttamisesta. The initiative and a transcript of the debate are available at: 
https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/Vaski/sivut/trip.aspx?triptype=ValtiopaivaAsiakirjat&docid=ptk
+8/2006, accessed April 23, 2019; For a full analysis of the debate, see Titus Hjelm, “National 
Piety: Religious Equality, Freedom of Religion and National Identity in Finnish Political 
Discourse,” Religion 44/1 (2014): 28–45. 
 
66 Ruth Wodak, “Introduction: Discourse Studies – Important Concepts and Terms,” 
in Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michal 
Krzyzanowski (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008), 1–29; Kari Palonen, “Speaking Pro et Contra: 
The Rhetorical Intelligibility of Parliamentary Politics and the Political Intelligibility of 
Parliamentary Rhetoric,” in The Parliamentary Style of Politics, ed. Suvi Soininen & Tapani 
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that focuses on the content of constitutions and legislation, or their impact, misses a whole 
world of sociologically significant material.67   
The initiative LA157/2005 was signed by Irina Krohn and Rosa Meriläinen, two 
Finnish Green Party MPs, but only Krohn sat in session when the proposal was brought to 
debate, bearing the brunt of the debate. The opposition to the proposal was unanimous—even 
the then Chair of the Green Party undermined it by stating that this was not a party initiative. 
Importantly, the focus on the “folk church” nature of the ELCF comprised only one aspect of 
the analyzed debate, but the connection between the ELCF and national identity is 
ideologically significant in light of what has been said above. The parliamentary discourse 
shows how the academic discourse, filtered through the ELCF’s self-understanding, is a 
major factor in reproducing religious inequality in Finland. 
The construction of the ELCF as “folk church” is explicit in the opening speech of the 
plenary session. In it, Christian Democrat MP Päivi Räsänen said: “The state is not 
denominational in itself, even though the Lutheran Church and also the Orthodox Church 
have the status of folk church.”68 The “folkness” of the ELCF is achieved in three distinct 
ways: symbolically, through an appeal to democracy, and by equating “Finnish values” with 
the values of the church. The first type equates the church with other national symbols, most 
explicitly in Räsänen’s already quoted opening speech:  
Quickly going through this list, it seems like just about the only things that are 
forgotten is a proposal to abandon the flag with the blue cross, and changing 
                                                 
67 E.g. Jack Barbalet, Adam Possamai, and Bryan Turner, eds., Religion and the State: 
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religious holidays into working days. In my opinion, the best part of this bill is 
its short list of signatories. 
Räsänen was here equating the stripping of the ELCF of its constitutionally privileged 
status with getting rid of the Finnish national flag. Rhetorically, this is an obvious expansion 
of the original issue, as the flag—possibly the most potent symbol of national identity—is of 
interest even to MPs indifferent to the politics of religion. It is also an intertextual reference 
to the famous Finnish saying “home, religion, and fatherland” (koti, uskonto ja isänmaa), 
which according to Virkkunen, “were the central Finnish values between the world wars.”69 
The connection between church and volk could hardly be more forcefully argued.  
Secondly, the MP’s opposing the initiative play the numbers game: the privileged 
status of the ELCF is justified, because in a democracy, it is the will of the people. Räsänen 
again summarized the discourse: “In legislative work, it is justified to take into consideration 
the prevailing religious circumstances. It is justified for a religious community’s legal status 
to reflect the community’s real status in society, and this is how democracy works.”70 She 
continued: “84 per cent of Finns belong to the church and of them 73 per cent have never 
considered leaving the church. The juridical status of the Lutheran church reflects the 
religious situation in the country and its religious-cultural history.” Finally, she repeated the 
idea in her closing statement: “Based simply on the principles of democracy, it is quite right 
that the influence of Christian values, Christian cultural heritage is visible.”71 The 
“democratic will” discourse was echoed in the responses of two Center Party MPs—
incidentally, both were also ordained Lutheran ministers. MP Lauri Oinonen said, somewhat 
incoherently, “the laws are in harmony with the fact that citizens, who are both citizens of the 
                                                 
69 S. Virkkunen, Suomalainen fraasisanakirja (Helsinki: Otava, 1981), 207. For a 
discussion of intertextuality, see Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, 101–136. 
70 Emphasis added. 
71 Emphasis added. 
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state, inhabitants of municipalities and mostly members of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, 
can live with a legislation which is in harmony with itself.” MP Simo Rundgren repeated the 
sentiment while defending religious education in state-funded schools: “About 85 per cent of 
Finns belong to the Lutheran church . . . This is just the way our will is.”  
In addition to national symbols and democratic will, MPs linked the privileged status 
of the church with Finnish values, the logic being that losing one would lead to the erosion of 
the other. This is not always expressed explicitly, but since the Christian values that Finnish 
society is putatively built upon are manifested in the church, changing the existing 
arrangement would be detrimental. Social Democrat MP Esa Lahtela argued that  
Finnish society is in any case built on this Christian value base. From that one 
could of course immediately say that when in Rome, do as the Romans do 
(maassa maan tavalla), which means that certain foundations have existed. 
Our legislation is built on a particular value base and it draws its strength from 
these values, which come from biblical doctrines, Christian doctrine. 
Lahtela’s Social Democrat colleague MP Kalevi Olin made the point that values are 
not just fancy dressing, but have material effects:  
That equality is realized is surely a modern aspiration, but, dear mister 
Speaker, according to research the success of Finnish society, for example in 
working life, is based on exactly the Protestant ethic, especially in agricultural 
but also in industrial society, on work ethic, and in this case it is worth asking 
whether there is a reason to abandon this kind of Lutheran viewpoint.    
Olin’s point is telling, because his statement implies that the work ethic is not only a 
Lutheran value, but an effect of the privileged status of the ELCF, which is, after all, the topic 
of the debate. Aspiring to equality is a commendable goal, but the price in this case would be 
too high.  
Krohn’s Green colleague, Erkki Pulliainen, made explicit that the values are 
institutionally manifested in the ELCF (and the Finnish Orthodox Church), hence 
reproducing the idea that touching the ELCF’s privileged status means, ultimately, tampering 
with the “ultimate things” in Finnish society:  
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Values belong to Finnish society as a very important element. Those particular 
values, specifically Christian values, whether they are realised (toteutuivatpa 
ne) in the Evangelical-Lutheran church or the Orthodox church, are very 
important things. They are downright ultimate things. 
Discourse works ideologically when it obfuscates and misdirects. The intent of the 
initiative—explained and defended on several occasions by MP Krohn during the debate—
was to make all religious communities equal in the eyes of law. It was not an attack on the 
ELCF as such, as Krohn had to remind her colleagues. However, the other MP’s responses 
switch the focus of discussion from a question of religious equality to a question of national 
identity. Few politicians oppose equality as a political principle, but even fewer want to 
undermine the central symbols of national identity. The equation of volk and church in the 
debate sealed the fate of the proposal.  
As noted above, for ideology critique absence is as important presence. Finnish 
church-state legislation has remained mostly untouched since the drafting of the first 
constitution and the original Freedom of Religion Act in the immediate years after Finland’s 
independence in 1917. Hence, one could have expected the LA157/2005 initiative to generate 
heated debate in the parliament. The debate that emerged was loud at times, but the silence 
was louder: Of the 200 MPs in the Finnish parliament, eight took part in the debate, including 
Irina Krohn, one of the initiative’s signatories. Now, we cannot get into the minds of these 
MPs in order to study their motivations, but it says something that so few—markedly, two of 
them Lutheran ministers and one known for her religious activism in parliament—bothered 
with any response at all. My thesis is that the same folk church ideology articulated by the 
several MPs present was manifested as absence among the rest: Changing the status quo was 
met by indifference or refusal to even debate the issue. Although it is obviously impossible to 
“prove” direct causal links, it is completely plausible to argue that the parliamentary 
discourse and the silence of the majority of MPs is a function of the established “folk church” 
discourse espoused by scholarship and the church itself. The difference is that in the 
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parliament the discourse has more immediate and direct consequences—in this case the 
preservation and reproduction of the status quo. Freedom of religion legislation in Finland 
might be robust from an individual’s perspective, but debates and silences such as the above 
perpetuate the inequality of religious communities.72  
Conclusion: The Ideological Function of “Folk Church”  
In the above, I worked towards a conceptual history of the concept of “folk church” in 
Finnish public discourse—not for genealogy’s sake, but in order to examine what is being 
done when people and institutions talk about “folk church.” The above analysis shows that 
the concept is used to obfuscate the relationship between the ELCF and the Finnish state. It is 
used to misdirect in order to maintain the constitutionally and legally privileged position of 
the ELCF. This is what I call “folk church ideology.” This ideology—meaning in the service 
of power—explains the discrepancy between international assessments of the Finnish church-
state status and the insistence of Finnish scholars, the ELCF, and politicians that Finland does 
not have a state church.  
A full analysis of why “folk church” is used ideologically warrants another study, but 
even a casual observer can note that dismantling the privileges of the ELCF in a secularizing 
society may have significant consequences for an institution that wields significant symbolic 
and material power. In turn—although the picture is far from simple—it is notable that the 
individuals (scholars, politicians) most keen to protect this privilege through ideological uses 
of “folk church” often have a stake in the ELCF and, consequently, in reproducing the 
religious status quo.  
One common criticism of ideology critique is its normative premise. It is true that any 
kind of critique proceeds from a normative position, whether articulated or not. However, that 
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does not make ideology critique unique in any way. First, as Minkenberg shows, normative 
conclusions are rife in church-state research, even if they are not explicit aims.73 Second, for 
pragmatic reasons, the focus of this paper has been in the uses of “folk church,” but the 
analysis could—and should—be extended to the ideological uses of “state church.” These are 
blatantly present in some atheist and freethinker discourses, for example. Finally, as said 
above, critiquing what I have here called folk church ideology does not mean that the concept 
is inaccurate or useless. On the contrary, there are many good reasons to call the ELCF a folk 
church. But that does not mean that it is not a state church at the same time. That is why we 
need contemporary ideology critique to examine how and why “folk church” is used to 
obfuscate this relationship.  
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